There is a trend to consider counterfactuals as invariably time-asymmetric. Recently, this trend manifested itself in the controversy about validity of counterfactual application of a time-symmetric quantum probability rule. Kastner (2003) analyzed this controversy and concluded that there are time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals which are consistent, but they turn out to be trivial. I correct Kastner's misquotation of my defense of time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals and explain their non-trivial aspects, thus contesting the claim that counterfactuals have to be time-asymmetric.
Introduction.
The issue of time (a)symmetry of counterfactuals has been addressed many times in the past, but it remains to be an open question, see for example Kutach (2002) . Less than a decade ago, Sharp and Shanks (1993) opened the discussion of time-symmetric counterfactuals in the context of quantum theory (TSQC), claiming that time-symmetric 1 approach of Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz (ABL) (1964) to quantum measurements is not applicable to counterfactual situations. The controversy which aroused after this paper was reviewed by Kastner (2003) who proposed that the ABL TSQC can be considered consistent, but that they provide no new information. In her analysis she presented my defense of the TSQC, but she misquoted and misinterpreted it. Here I want to correct this, to state what is the difficulty of TSQC which I resolved, and contest the claim that the TSQC are trivial.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next two sections I describe the two misquotations of my approach made by Kastner. In Section 4 I briefly discuss the controversy about counterfactual application of the ABL rule and in sections 5 and 6 I analyze two examples. Section 7 concludes the paper by discussion of the relation to the general question of time-symmetry of counterfactuals.
First Misquotation.
In her arguments, Kastner (2003) relies few times on the fact that I 'acknowledge that post-selection results can't be actually "fixed"' (p.8,23 of preprint). To support this claim she brings in footnote 5 a quotation from Vaidman (1999a) . Let me enlarge the quotation, the part quoted by Kastner appears in the second paragraph and I put it in italics.
A different asymmetry (although it looks very similar) is in what we assume to be "fixed", i.e., which properties of the actual world we assume to be true in possible counterfactual worlds. The past and not the future of the system is fixed.
It seems that while the first asymmetry can be easily removed, the second asymmetry is unavoidable. According to standard quantum theory a system is described by its quantum state. In the actual world, in which a certain measurement has been performed at time t (or no measurement has been performed at t) the system is described by a certain state before t, and by some 2 state after time t. In the counterfactual world in which a different measurement was performed at time t, the state before t is, of course, the same, but the state after time t is invariably different (if the observables measured in actual and counterfactual worlds have different eigenstates). Therefore, we cannot hold fixed the quantum state of the system in the future.
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The argument above shows that for constructing time-symmetric counterfactuals we have to give up the description of a quantum system by its quantum state. Fortunately we can do that without loosing anything except the change due to the measurement at time t which caused the difficulty. A quantum state at a given time is completely defined by the results of a complete set of measurements performed prior to this time. Therefore, we can take the set of all results performed on a quantum system as a description of the world of the system instead of describing the system by its quantum state. (This proposal will also help to avoid ambiguity and some controversies related to the description of a single quantum system by its quantum state.) Thus, I propose the following definition of counterfactuals in the framework of quantum theory:
(ii) If a measurement M were performed at time t, then it would have property P, provided that the results of all measurements performed on the system at all times except the time t are fixed.
For time-asymmetric situations in which only the results of measurements performed before t are given (and thus only these results are fixed) this definition of counterfactuals is equivalent to the counterfactuals as they have usually been used. However, when the results of measurements performed on the system both before and after the time t are given, definition (ii) yields novel time-symmetrized counterfactuals. In particular, for the ABL case, in which complete measurements are performed on the system at t 1 and t 2 , t 1 < t < t 2 , we obtain (iii) If a measurement of an observable C were performed at time t, then the probability for C = c j would equal p j , provided that the results of measurements performed on the system at times t 1 and t 2 are fixed.
Just from the structure of my writing, it is clear that I do not claim as true what
Kastner took as the quotation: the paragraph starts with "It seems" and in the following paragraph I show that we can overcome the difficulty. Moreover, as I will explain below, the difficulty is not related to fixing the outcome of the measurement at t 2 , the issue which concerns Kastner.
Second Misquotation.
Second misquotation is Kastner's claim that I "attribute values to observables that were not measured". Indeed, the name "elements of reality" (Vaidman 1993 ) and the title "How to Ascertain the Values of σ x , σ y , and σ z of a Spin-
Particle" (Vaidman, Aharonov, and Albert, 1987) might suggest this. However, if Kastner wants faithfully to present my approach, she should not ignore my reply (Vaidman, 1999c) to her other paper (Kastner, 1999b) . Let me quote two paragraphs from my reply (p. 866).
I define that there is an element of reality at time t for an observable C, "C = c" when it can be inferred with certainty that the result of a measurement of C, if performed, is c. Frequently, in such a situation it is said that the observable C has the value c. It is important to stress that both expressions do not assume "ontological" meaning for c, the meaning according to which the system has some (hidden) variable with the value c. I do not try to restore realistic picture of classical theory: in quantum theory observables do not possess values. The only meaning of the expressions: "the element of reality C = c" and "C has the value c" is the operational meaning: it is known with certainty that if C is measured at time t, then the result is c.
Clearly, my concept of elements of reality has its roots in "elements of reality" from the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen paper (EPR) (1935) . There are numerous works analyzing the EPR elements of reality. My impression that EPR were looking for an ontological concept and their "criteria for elements of reality" is just a property of this concept. I had no intention to define such ontological concept. I apologize for taking this name and using it in a very different sense, thus, apparently, misleading many readers. I hope to clarify my intentions here and I welcome suggestions for alternative name for my concept which will avoid the confusion.
If there is an element of reality C = c, then, apart from the counterfactual statement about the result of the measurement of C (which is the definition of "element of reality"), the quantum system has some other features, as will be described in two examples in Sections 5 and 6. However, it does not mean that there is something in the system which possesses value c.
The controversy about counterfactual application of the ABL rule.
The ABL rule is usually considered in situations in which the counterfactual has compound antecedent with three parts: (1) result of a complete measurement at t 1 , (2) the fact that some measurement was performed at time t, and (3) the result of a complete measurement at t 2 , t 1 < t < t 2 . I have argued before (1999a) that the controversy aroused from the error of Sharp and Shank, who considered the probability of the result of a measurement at time t without taking in account (2), i.e., the fact that the measurement has been performed.
Kastner admits that when we take all compounds of the antecedent, the inconsistency I will convert the first example into a raffle. In a raffle each participant brings his own spin-1 2 particle on which the organizers perform a measurement of a spin component in one of the there directions, x, y, or z. The participant gets his particle back and he has to provide three statements: if the measurement was in x direction, the result was s x , if the measurement was in y direction, the result was s y , and if the measurement was in z direction, the result was s z . (This is a typical situation when counterfactuals considered in the context of quantum mechanics. Several statements are made together about measurements which cannot be performed together.) The participant is a winner, if his statement about the measurement which was actually performed was correct.
Our surprising result is that a participant equipped with quantum devices can always win. It is simple to prepare the spin in one of the three directions. The participant can also measure the spin in another direction when he gets the particle back. In this way he can infer the results of measurements in two directions, but to know the results for three directions is a highly nontrivial task. Experimentalists found it interesting enough to actually perform this experiment in a laboratory, Schulz (2002) .
In this example there is no small probability of having all compounds of the antecedent true together. To achieve the task, the participant have to perform certain measurements which might have different outcomes, but in all cases he can make correct statements. (It does not mean that I accept Kastner's argument about "cotenability" of the pre-and postselection together with a particular intermediate measurement. The fact that in many "surprising" situations the probability to succeed in the post-selection is small, does not make corresponding counterfactuals vacuous as Kastner claims. The only requirement is that the probability for the post-selection does not vanish.)
One might claim that the unusual features belong to the ABL rule itself, and not to the counterfactual usage of it, because, after all, only one of the three statements was tested and this statement was about actually performed experiment. I can argue against this claim, but instead let me discuss another aspect of this situation.
Let us limit ourselves to the cases in which the participant claims that the outcome of the spin component measurement, irrespectively of the direction of measurement is +h 2 . The probability of such a case is . In this situation, in my language, there are three "elements of reality": s x =h 2 , s y =h 2 , s z =h 2 . These elements of reality yield new information about the system that the "weak values" (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1990 ) of the spin components are (s x ) w = (s y ) w = (s z ) w =h 2 , the proof is given in Aharonov and Vaidman (1991) . Weak values are measured using standard measuring devices, but with weakened coupling. This allows measuring several variables together, however, for the price of the accuracy of the measurement. Since, for any variables, (A + B) w = A w + B w , the weak value of the spin component
(while the eigenvalues of s ξ are ±h 2 ). The center of the distribution of the particle position in the Stern-Gerlach experiment measuring s ξ using weak coupling will be outside the range of the eigenvalues! This is the new and nontrivial information which we learn about the system characterized by the three elements reality (the ABL counterfactuals) stated above.
The three-boxes example.
Another example mentioned by Kastner, the particle in three boxes pre-selected in a superposition of being in all three boxes
(|A + |B + |C ) and post-selected in another superposition in all three boxes
(|A +|B −|C ). The surprising feature of this particle is that we are certain to find it inside box A if it searched there and also inside box B if it searched there instead.
It is not trivial as Kastner's raffle example, since neither pre-selection nor post-selection alone specify the truth of the counterfactual. Moreover, it is more subtle than a trivial example of this kind with a particle pre-selected in A and B and post-selected in B and C which is to be found with certainty inside box B if it is searched there.
In our example, the particle acts as if it is simultaneously in two boxes for any single test of its location. As for the spin- particle example, even more interesting features of the quantum system which yield the elements of reality: "the particle is in A", and "the particle is in B" find their manifestation in the results of weak measurements (Vaidman, 1999c) . The particle acts as if it is simultaneously in two boxes for multiple weak measurements of its location. Recently, Aharonov and I (2002) noticed yet another surprising feature of the system with these counterfactuals. The particle acts as if it is simultaneously in two boxes also for a "superposition" of strong tests of its location. An external single quantum particle in a superposition of moving toward boxes A and B which interacts strongly with the particle in the box will scatter from our particle in the way as if there were two particles, one in each box. (Note that Kastner (2002) has not found this example surprising either.)
Time asymmetry of counterfactuals.
Beyond the controversy about the level of triviality (or non-triviality) of particular examples, the ABL counterfactuals can play an important role in a more general controversy about time asymmetry of all counterfactuals. There is a trend to view counterfactuals 8 invariably time asymmetric. For example, Kutach (2002) worries that his Entropy Theory of Counterfactuals "fails as an explanation of counterfactual asymmetry".
According to the orthodox view, determining the truth values of counterfactuals is finding the most similar worlds where the antecedent holds, but usually there are no well defined criteria for similarity of worlds. The situation is more clear when we consider counterfactuals related to behavior of a physical system under changed conditions at time t: In order to evaluate the counterfactual we have to consider possible worlds which are similar to the actual world except for the antecedent of the counterfactual. In asymmetric counterfactual, in which the similarity of the worlds is considered only in the past, the worlds of the physical system can be considered identical. The change at time t caused by an external intervention. (In general-type counterfactuals in which there is no division into the system and an external agent, we have to deal with the question of the origin of the change.) However, in time-symmetric counterfactuals in which the system is considered both before and after the intervention at time t, it seems that we cannot consider identical worlds. In particular, it seems to be the case for a quantum measurement at time t, because measurements change the state of quantum systems.
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My definition of counterfactuals (ii) resolves this difficulty (Vaidman 1999a (Vaidman , 1999b .
The counterfactual and actual worlds are identical except for what is happening at t, the time at which the actual and the counterfactual worlds differ by definition. The solution came from defining a world of a quantum system by the list of the results of measurements performed on that system. It also fits well in the framework of the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics where I defined the concept of a world in a similar manner (Vaidman, 2002) .
As far as I know, this is the first example of a nontrivial time-symmetric counterfactual and its existence might change the trend of considering counterfactuals as necessarily time-asymmetric.
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